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Abstract 
 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has been extraordinarily successful in 
the task of knowledge synthesis and risk assessment.  However, the strong scientific consensus 
on the detection, attribution, and risks of climate change stands in stark contrast to widespread 
confusion, complacency and denial among policymakers and the public. Risk communication is 
now a major bottleneck preventing science from playing an appropriate role in climate policy. 
Here I argue that the ability of the IPCC to fulfill its mission can be enhanced through better 
understanding of the mental models of the audiences it seeks to reach, then altering the 
presentation and communication of results accordingly.  Few policymakers are trained in 
science, and public understanding of basic facts about climate change is poor.  But the problem is 
deeper.  Our mental models lead to persistent errors and biases in complex dynamic systems like 
the climate and economy. Where the consequences of our actions spill out across space and time, 
our mental models have narrow boundaries and focus on the short term.  Where the dynamics of 
complex systems are conditioned by multiple feedbacks, time delays, accumulations and 
nonlinearities, we have difficulty recognizing and understanding feedback processes, 
underestimate time delays, and do not understand basic principles of accumulation or how 
nonlinearities can create regime shifts.  These problems arise not only among laypeople but also 
among highly educated elites with significant training in science.  They arise not only in complex 
systems like the climate but also in familiar contexts such as filling a bathtub.  Therefore they 
cannot be remedied merely by providing more information about the climate, but require 
different modes of communication, including experiential learning environments such as 
interactive simulations.  
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“Dr. Burgess. Well, let me ask you this.… Why do you think it is — if the vast preponderance of 
science and scientists agree with you and your position [that anthropogenic climate change is real and 
poses serious risks], why haven’t you closed the deal with the public? 
Mr. Somerville.  That is a very good question.  I think that we, as a science community, suffer as 
communicators.  I think that we have not done a good job of outreach…. 
Dr. Burgess. ….So why — again, I would pose my question to you — why have you not closed the deal 
with the public?	  Why, when I go home to my district and have my town-halls, why is the public not 
clamoring for me to control carbon in the atmosphere…?” 
—Representative Michael Burgess, M.D., questioning Dr. Richard Somerville, Scripps Institution of 
Oceanography, 8 March 2011, in US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Energy and Power 
hearing on “Climate Science and the EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Regulations”; http://bit.ly/etpa11. 
1 The Challenge of Risk Communication on Climate Change 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) constitutes a remarkable 
mobilization of the world’s best climate scientists and has unquestionably had a major impact on 
our knowledge of climate change.  However, the strong scientific consensus on the detection, 
attribution, and risks of climate change stands in stark contrast to widespread confusion, 
complacency and denial among policymakers, the media and the public.  Although the IPCC’s 
Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) clearly states: “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal” 
and “Most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is 
very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic GHG [greenhouse gas] concentrations” 
(IPCC 2007, SPM pp. 2, 5; emphasis in the original), public opinion surveys show the opposite.  
Americans are now “less worried about the threat of global warming, less convinced that its 
effects are already happening, and more likely to believe that scientists themselves are uncertain 
about its occurrence” (Gallup 2010).  There is a huge and growing gap between the science and 
the understanding of that science in society at large.  Why does this gulf exist, why does it 
matter, and what are its implications for the IPCC and scientific community?   
Policies to manage complex natural and technical systems should be based on the best 
available scientific knowledge.  In democracies, however, the beliefs of the public, not only 
those of experts, affect government policy.  Without effective risk communication, the most 
thorough risk assessment is, at best, wasted (Olson 2009, Dean 2009).  At worst, poor risk 
communication creates a knowledge vacuum that is then filled by error, disinformation and 
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falsehood—some supplied inadvertently by people without knowledge of the science and some 
injected deliberately by ideologues and vested interests (Oreskes and Conway 2010).  
Here I argue that the effectiveness of the IPCC can be improved through readily implemented 
changes in the way it creates and presents technical reports and communications intended for 
policymakers, the media, business leaders and the general public.  The recommended changes 
are grounded in decades of research on the errors and biases arising from the mental models and 
heuristics we use to evaluate risks and make decisions in complex systems.  These errors and 
biases are common not only among the general public but also among scientists and other highly 
educated individuals. They arise not only in the context of unfamiliar systems like the climate 
but also in familiar, everyday contexts such as compound interest or filling a bathtub.  Therefore 
they cannot be remedied merely by providing more information about the climate, but require 
different kinds of communication, including the use of experiential learning environments such 
as interactive simulations that allow people to discover, for themselves, the dynamics of complex 
systems like the climate. While surely not sufficient, the principles articulated here can help 
improve the effectiveness of scientific communication and overcome the disinformation, 
political polarization, and denial that now prevent science from informing public policy.   
First, I review the large gap between scientific knowledge of climate change and public 
understanding and describe the challenge of risk communication around complex issues such as 
climate change.  I trace this gap to pervasive errors and biases in judgment and decision making 
generally, and specifically to people’s mental models about the structure and behavior of 
complex dynamic systems.  Where the dynamics of complex systems are conditioned by multiple 
feedbacks, time delays, accumulations and nonlinearities, mental models, including those of 
highly educated elites, often fail to account for these elements of dynamic complexity.  I 
conclude with recommendations to improve the way the IPCC, and scientists generally, can 
communicate complex concepts to policymakers, the media and the public so that both public 
policy and private behavior can be grounded in the best scientific understanding.  
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2  The Widening Gap  
The IPCC was established “to provide the world with a clear scientific view on the current 
state of knowledge in climate change and its potential environmental and socio-economic 
impacts….Because of its scientific and intergovernmental nature, the IPCC embodies a unique 
opportunity to provide rigorous and balanced scientific information to decision makers” 
(www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml; IPCC 2006). The task is daunting.  Scientists 
from many specialties must work together to synthesize scientific knowledge of an immensely 
complex system encompassing the climate, the economy and society.  Given the difficulties, the 
IPCC has been extraordinarily successful in the task of synthesis and risk assessment.  But that is 
not sufficient.  To fulfill its mission, the IPCC must also communicate that knowledge 
effectively to diverse constituencies including policymakers, the media and the public.  
Unfortunately, although scientific knowledge of climate change has improved dramatically 
since the founding of the IPCC, public understanding has fallen: “48% of Americans now 
believe that the seriousness of global warming is generally exaggerated, up from…31% in 1997” 
(Gallup 2010; Figure 1).  Public opinion in other nations follows roughly similar patterns 
(Leiserowitz 2007).  
More disturbing, US public opinion is now strongly split along partisan lines.  Republicans 
are much more likely than Democrats to deny that climate change is real or poses risks to human 
welfare (Gallup 2010).  Leiserowitz et al. (2010) found 81% of Democrats agree that global 
warming is happening, but only 47% of Republicans; 68% of Democrats believe global warming 
is caused mostly by human activities, but only 33% of Republicans.  These huge gaps are not 
disagreements about what should be done to the address risks of global warming, an issue 
outside the IPCC’s mandate.  They are disagreements about the scientific facts.  Despite the 
efforts of the IPCC and scientific community, political ideology, not science, increasingly 
determines what people believe to be true about the physical world.  
Some may argue that poor public understanding of climate change is unimportant because 
the audience for the work of the IPCC is policymakers, who are then expected to communicate 
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with the public.  This is incorrect.  First, as shown below, highly educated adults with substantial 
training in Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) suffer from systematic 
biases in judgment and decision-making and in assessing the dynamics of the climate-economy 
system.  There is no reason to believe policymakers are immune to these problems.  Second, 
whether policymakers seek to understand the science depends on whether the public values 
leaders who value science.  Even if policymakers fully understood climate science, their ability 
to implement policies consistent with that knowledge, given societal goals, is constrained by the 
lack of grassroots political support.  The public cannot be ignored.  
However, when science conflicts with “common sense” people are unlikely to favor or adopt 
policies consistent with science (Fischhoff 2007, 2009, Morgan et al. 2001, Slovic, 2000, 
Bostrom et al. 1994, Read et al. 1994).  Strong scientific evidence documents the benefits of seat 
belts, motorcycle helmets, and childhood vaccinations, yet legislation mandating their use took 
decades.  Citizen groups campaign actively against many of these policies, and compliance 
remains spotty.  The connection between actions and outcomes in these cases is far simpler than 
the connection between GHG emissions, climate and human welfare.  
Effective risk communication strategies begin with a deep understanding of the mental 
models of the relevant audience, as Morgan et al. (2001, p. 19) pointedly argue:  
“Rather than conduct a systematic analysis of what the public believes and what information they need to 
make the decisions they face, communicators typically ask technical experts what they think people should 
be told….Those passing judgment may know very little about either the knowledge or the needs of the 
intended audience.  Under such conditions, it is not surprising that audiences often miss the point and 
become confused, annoyed, or disinterested.  If the communicators feel that they have done everything that 
is expected of them, they may conclude that their audience was responsible for the communications 
failure.” 
What then are the mental models people hold about complex dynamic systems such as the 
climate and economy? 
3  Scientific Literacy 
Studies consistently show low levels of reading comprehension, scientific literacy and 
numeracy among members of the public in the US and other nations (Kutner et al. 2007, 
Gonzales et al. 2009, Hartley et al. 2011).  Most people, including most policymakers, 
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legislators, and their advisors, have not been trained in STEM.  Lacking basic scientific 
knowledge, policymakers and the public have difficulty understanding the IPCC’s reports, 
including the Summary for Policymakers (SPM), a document intended for, well, policymakers 
and other nonscientists.   To assess the readability of the SPM, I calculated the Gunning Fog 
index, a measure of the number of years of education required to understand a text.  The Fog 
index for the AR4 SPM is nearly 17, indicating post-graduate training is needed to understand it.1  
That estimate certainly understates the problem.  The Fog index considers only sentence and 
word length, while the SPM includes complex graphics, technical jargon (“anthropogenic GHG 
concentrations”, “paleoclimatic”, “climate-carbon cycle feedbacks”), chemical terms and 
formulae (perfluorocarbons, CO2, CH4) and units of measure (ppm, ppb, W/m2, GtCO2-eq/yr).   
The problem is not just readability, but a huge gap between people’s understanding of basic 
science and the explanations in the SPM.  For example, Leiserowitz and Smith (2010) asked US 
adults how much various factors “affect the average global temperature of the earth,” finding 
56% chose “A lot” “Some” or “A little” for earthquakes, and 44% chose those options for the 
phases of the moon.  Asked how much various items contribute to global warming, 76% chose 
“A lot” “Some” or “A little” for “Aerosol spray cans,” only slightly less than the 80% choosing 
those options for “Burning fossil fuels for heat and electricity.” 
4  Poor Inquiry Skills 
The heuristics people commonly use in judgment and decision-making lead to a host of 
systematic errors and biases.  The research is well known, so I provide only a brief survey (see, 
e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982, Plous 1993, Kahneman and Tversky 2000, Gilovic, 
Griffin and Kahneman 2002).  We violate basic rules of probability and do not update our beliefs 
according to Bayes’ rule.  We underestimate uncertainty (overconfidence bias), assess desirable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Gunning Fog index is given by 0.4(W/S) + 100(W3/W) where W is the number of words in the text, S is the 
number of sentences, and W3 is the number of words of three or more syllables.  Fog index calculated by 
www.editcentral.com/gwt1/EditCentral.html (result: 16.7) and www.online-
utility.org/english/readability_test_and_improve.jsp (result: 16.9). 
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outcomes as more likely than undesirable outcomes (wishful thinking), and believe we can 
influence the outcome of random events (the illusion of control).  We make different decisions 
based on the way the data are presented (framing) and when exposed to irrelevant information 
(anchoring).  We credit our personal experience and salient information too highly and 
underweight more reliable but less visceral data such as scientific studies (availability bias, base 
rate fallacy).  We are swayed by a host of persuasion techniques that exploit our emotions and 
our desire to avoid cognitive dissonance, to be liked, and to go with the crowd (Cialdini 2009). 
More troubling, people generally do not reason in accordance with the principles of scientific 
method.  We do not generate sufficient alternative explanations for a phenomenon, do not 
adequately control for confounding variables, and seek evidence consistent with prior beliefs 
rather than potential disconfirmation (confirmation bias).  We revise beliefs and even memories 
after events so that we feel “we knew it all along” (hindsight bias).  In constructing causal 
explanations, we tend to assume each effect has a single cause and infer causal relationships on 
the basis of covariation, proximity in time and space, and similarity (Einhorn and Hogarth 1986).  
Scientists and professionals, not only “ordinary” people, suffer from many of these judgmental 
biases (Cialdini 2009, Connolly et al. 2000, Gilovich et al. 2002, Tetlock 2005).   
Our judgments are also strongly affected by unconscious processes.  Risen and Critcher 
(2011) asked people to complete a survey under a variety of warm or cool conditions.  People’s 
belief in global warming was significantly higher in the warm conditions than the cool, while 
responses to items unrelated to heat were not affected.  Li, Johnson and Zaval (2011) found 
people in the US and Australia expressed more belief in and were more concerned about global 
warming if they perceived the temperature that day to be warmer than usual.  Egan and Mullin 
(2010) integrated survey data with local weather conditions when participants completed the 
survey, finding “For each three-and-a-half degrees Fahrenheit that local temperature rises above 
normal, Americans become one percentage point more likely to agree that there is ‘solid 
evidence’ that the earth is getting warmer” (p. 5).   
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5  Mental models of Complex Systems 
The judgmental errors and biases described above are particularly acute in complex dynamic 
systems. Whereas complex systems such as the climate and economy are dynamic, tightly 
coupled, governed by feedback, nonlinear, self-organizing, adaptive and evolving, our mental 
models tend to be static and narrow.  We are often unaware of the delayed and distal impacts of 
our decisions, overemphasizing the local and short term.  We don’t understand the process of 
accumulation (stocks and flows), feedback, time delays, nonlinearity and other concepts 
necessary to understand the dynamics of complex systems such as the climate and economy 
(Sterman 1994).  These errors have profound implications for risk communication. 
5.1  Stocks and Flows.  The process of accumulation—stocks and the flows that alter them—is 
fundamental to understanding dynamics in general and the climate-economy system in particular.  
The stock of CO2 in the atmosphere accumulates the flow of CO2 emissions less the flow of CO2 
from the atmosphere to biomass and the ocean.  The mass of the Greenland ice sheet 
accumulates snowfall less melting and calving.  The stock of coal-fired power plants is increased 
by construction and reduced by decommissioning.  And so on.   
People should have good intuitive understanding of accumulation because stocks and flows 
are pervasive in everyday experience.  Yet research shows that people’s intuitive understanding 
of stocks and flows is poor in two ways that cause error in assessing climate dynamics.  First, 
people have difficulty relating the flows into and out of a stock to the level of the stock, even in 
simple, familiar contexts such as bank accounts and bathtubs.  Second, narrow mental model 
boundaries mean people are often unaware of the networks of stocks and flows in a system. 
Poor understanding of accumulation leads to serious errors in reasoning about climate 
change.  Sterman and Booth Sweeney (2007) gave graduate students at MIT a description of the 
relationships among GHG emissions and atmospheric concentrations excerpted from the SPM in 
the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report.  Participants were then asked to sketch the emissions 
trajectory required to stabilize atmospheric CO2 by 2100 at various concentrations.  To draw 
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attention to the stock-flow structure, participants were first directed to estimate future net 
removal of CO2 from the atmosphere (net CO2 taken up by the oceans and biomass), then draw 
the emissions path needed to stabilize atmospheric CO2.  The dynamics are easily understood 
without knowledge of calculus or climate science using a bathtub analogy: atmospheric CO2 rises 
when the inflow to the tub (emissions) exceeds the outflow (net removal), is unchanging when 
inflow equals outflow, and falls when outflow exceeds inflow.  Yet, 84% violated these 
principles of accumulation.  Most (63%) erroneously asserted that stabilizing emissions above 
net removal would stabilize atmospheric CO2—analogous to arguing a bathtub continuously 
filled faster than it drains will never overflow.  The false belief that stabilizing emissions would 
quickly stabilize the climate not only violates mass balance, one of the most basic laws of 
physics, but leads to complacency about the magnitude and urgency of emissions reductions 
required to mitigate climate change risk (Sterman 2008).  
It might be argued that people understand the principles of accumulation but don’t 
understand the carbon cycle or climate context.  But the same errors arise in familiar settings 
such as bathtubs and bank accounts (Booth Sweeney and Sterman 2000, Sterman 2002, Cronin, 
Gonzalez and Sterman 2009).  Moreover, training in science does not prevent these errors. 
Three-fifths of the participants had degrees in STEM; most others were trained in economics.  
These individuals are demographically similar to, and many will become, influential leaders in 
business and government, though with more STEM training than most.  Merely providing more 
information on the carbon cycle will not alter the false belief that stabilizing emissions would 
quickly stabilize the climate. 
5.2 Time Delays.  People routinely ignore or underestimate time delays (Sterman 1989, 2000; 
Buehler et al. 2002).  Underestimating time delays leads people to believe, wrongly, that it is 
prudent to “wait and see” whether a potential environmental risk will actually cause harm.  Many 
citizens, including many who believe climate change poses serious risks, advocate a wait-and-see 
approach, reasoning that uncertainty about the causes and consequences of climate change means 
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potentially costly actions to address the risks should be deferred.  If climate change turns out to 
be more harmful than expected, policies to mitigate it can then be implemented.  
Wait-and-see policies often work well in simple systems, specifically those with short lags 
between detection of a problem and the implementation and impact of corrective actions. In 
boiling water for tea, one can wait until the kettle boils before taking action because there is 
essentially no delay between the boiling of the water and the whistle of the kettle, nor between 
hearing the whistle and removing the kettle from the flame.  To be a prudent response to the risks 
of climate change, wait-and-see policies require short delays in all the links of a long causal 
chain, stretching from the detection of adverse climate impacts to the implementation of 
mitigation policies to the resulting emissions reductions to changes in atmospheric GHG 
concentrations to radiative forcing to surface warming to changes in ice cover, sea level, weather 
patterns, agricultural productivity, habitat loss and species distribution, extinction rates, and 
other impacts.  None of these conditions hold:  there are long delays in every link of the chain.   
More problematic, the short- and long-run impacts of policies are often different (Forrester 
1969, Sterman 2000, Repenning and Sterman 2001).  Such “Worse Before Better” and “Better 
Before Worse” behavior is common: restoring a depleted fishery requires cutting the catch today; 
credit card debt boosts consumption today but forces austerity when the bills come due.  The 
tradeoff between short- and long-run responses is particularly difficult in the context of climate 
change because the lags are exceptionally long.   Standard frameworks for intertemporal 
tradeoffs such as discounting are problematic because potentially catastrophic events sufficiently 
far in the future, such as sea level rise from the loss of the Greenland or West Antarctic ice 
sheets, are given essentially no weight even if discount rates are small.  Further, people 
commonly exhibit inconsistent time preferences (Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue 
2002).  For example, people often prefer two candy bars in 101 days over one candy bar in 100 
days, but prefer one bar today over two tomorrow, a violation of standard assumptions of rational 
decision theory.  The preference for immediate gratification, which appears to have a 
neurological basis (McClure et al. 2004), often leads people to avoid actions with long-term 
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benefits they themselves judge to be desirable, over and above the usual effects of discounting.   
5.3 Misperceptions of Feedback  
The climate and economy are feedback rich systems.  Understanding their dynamics and the 
likely impact of policies requires an ability to (1) recognize and (2) understand a diverse array of 
feedbacks, both positive and negative, and their (highly nonlinear) interactions.  Few mental 
models, however, incorporate feedback processes.  Axelrod’s (1976) classic study of the mental 
models of political elites found few considered any feedback loops.   Dörner (1980, 1996) found 
that people tend to think in single-strand causal series and had difficulty in systems with side 
effects and multiple causal pathways, much less feedback loops.  Booth Sweeney and Sterman 
(2007) found limited recognition of feedback processes among both middle school students and 
their teachers in ecological and economic contexts.   
Even when the concept of closed loops is explained, the concepts of positive and negative 
feedback are poorly understood.  For most people, “positive feedback” means praise, while 
“negative feedback” is a euphemism for criticism. The confusion is not merely semantic, but 
arises from open-loop mental models.  People routinely assume that positive (negative) feedback 
is good (bad) and have difficulty understanding that feedbacks can be either beneficial or 
harmful depending on one’s values and on which way the loop is operating.  Consider the 
familiar positive feedback of compound interest:  The greater the outstanding balance on one’s 
credit card, the higher the monthly interest, so (ceteris paribus) the greater the balance and the 
higher still the interest due.  When debt is growing, that positive feedback is “bad” for the debtor 
but “good” for the card issuer (until the debtor defaults; a nonlinear regime shift).  But if the 
debtor starts paying down the debt, the same positive feedback speeds elimination of the balance, 
a process the debtor finds pleasing, while it erodes the lender’s profit.  The confusion of 
positive/negative feedback with good/bad is particularly problematic in the context of climate 
change, where the negative feedbacks of black body radiation and CO2 fertilization help limit 
warming, while positive climate-carbon cycle feedbacks worsen it. 
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Compounding the misperceptions of feedback in people’s mental models, research also 
shows that people do not understand the behavior of even the simplest feedback systems.  We 
tend to extrapolate linearly instead of exponentially even in obvious positive feedback systems 
(Wagenaar 1978, Wagenaar and Sagaria 1975).  The phenomenon is readily demonstrated with 
the famous “paper folding” task.  I begin with an ordinary sheet of copy paper, which I show 
participants is about 0.1 mm thick:   
Consider an ordinary sheet of paper like this one.  Fold it in half.  Fold the sheet in half again.  The paper is 
still less than half a millimeter thick.  If you were to fold the paper 40 more times, how thick would it be?  
Do not use a calculator.  We are interested in your intuitive judgment.  Along with your estimate, give the 
95% upper and lower confidence bound for your estimate (that is, a range you are 95% sure includes the 
right answer.  Your 95% confidence bound means you believe there is only a 5% chance the correct answer 
falls outside the upper and lower bounds you give).  
 Lower Bound 
(95% sure it is between lower and 
upper bound) 
Your 
Estimate 
Upper Bound 
(95% sure it is between lower and 
upper bound) 
42 Folds    
After 42 doublings the paper would be roughly 440,000 km (≈ 273,000 miles) thick, farther 
than the distance from the earth to the moon. 	  Typical of results with diverse groups, the median 
estimate in a sample of 95 graduate students at the MIT Sloan School of Management was 0.05 
meters (less than two inches), and the mean, skewed by a few higher responses, was 134 km (≈ 
83 miles).  None of the confidence bounds included the correct value—we not only fail to 
understand exponential growth, but we are grossly overconfident in our judgments (Lichtenstein, 
Fischhoff and Phillips 1982).  Some students provided the correct formula but still failed to grasp 
its implications, such as the student who wrote, correctly, “0.1mm*242”, but gave an upper 
confidence bound of 1.2 km, less than three-quarters of a mile.   
The feedbacks affecting climate dynamics interact nonlinearly, creating the possibility of 
thresholds and tipping points. Although the term “tipping point” has become a cliché, people 
generally do not understand nonlinearity or the dynamics of shifting feedback loop dominance 
(e.g., Paich and Sterman 1993).  Worse, poor understanding of time delays, accumulation and 
feedbacks mean people often trigger tipping inadvertently even when they know a threshold 
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exists.  For example, participants in simulated fisheries frequently expand their fleets beyond the 
maximum sustainable yield, forcing the system over the tipping threshold into the regime in 
which smaller fish stocks reduce recruitment, leading to still lower stocks and the collapse of the 
fishery.  Overshooting the tipping point persists in laboratory experiments even when the 
common pool resource problem (the Tragedy of the Commons) is eliminated by assigning 
perfect property rights (Moxnes 1998, 2004).  
6 Policy Recommendations 
To improve the effectiveness of its reports and communications the IPCC should partner with 
social scientists, risk communication experts, and communication professionals.  These experts 
should be engaged throughout the assessment process, not brought in at the end.  Social scientists 
and risk communication experts should participate in working group meetings and plenary 
sessions so they can develop their understanding of climate science and so that climate scientists 
can develop their understanding of the relevant social science.  Climate scientists will not 
become sociologists and psychologists, nor will social scientists become climatologists and 
economists.  But sustained collaboration is required to overcome the silos that thwart 
communication across disciplinary boundaries.  Taking the science and “throwing it over the 
wall” to communication specialists will fail.  
The IPCC can also learn from the experience of other organizations whose scientific work is 
effective only to the extent it affects the beliefs and behaviors of policymakers and the public 
such as the Food and Drug Administration, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and 
National Hurricane Center. As an example, NSF and NOAA recently developed a program to 
improve hurricane risk communication (http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2008/nsf08551/nsf08551.pdf).  
6.1  Scientific Literacy:  Reports and other communications, particularly those intended for 
policymakers and the public, should be written in plain language, with minimal technical jargon. 
Proposed text and graphics should be tested by communication professionals with representative 
members of the relevant audiences—policymakers, business leaders, the media and the public at 
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large—then revised and retested until they are both accurate and effective:  “one should no more 
release an untested…[risk] communication than an untested drug” (Fischhoff 2009, p. 950).  The 
process above differs substantially from current IPCC practice in which the SPM is developed 
from the working group reports by scientists and representatives of IPCC member states.     
6.2  Poor inquiry skills:  Fischhoff (2009) and Morgan et al. (2001) provide guidelines for 
improving risk communication in various contexts; Moser and Dilling (2004), Fischhoff (2007) 
and Weber and Stern (2011) apply them to climate change.  These include attending to the 
impact of information framing and anchors (textual, numeric and graphical), to the availability 
and salience of examples and so on.  They recommend focusing on the most important risks and 
people’s deepest concerns, and on alerting people to ways their judgments may be biased by the 
way information is presented.  Fischhoff (2009, p. 949) concludes that effective communication 
seeks to “complete mental models, bridging the gaps between expert and lay mental models,” 
“ensure appropriate confidence in beliefs,” and “provide information in the order of its expected 
impact on decisions.”  These guidelines are notably different from communications that contain a 
mass of detail in the name of precision or are organized by sectors or academic disciplines.   
6.3  Mental models of complex systems:  A number of techniques can help with the 
difficulties people have in understanding the structure and behavior of complex systems. 
Stocks, flows and accumulation:  Pictures of bathtubs with tap and drain (or, better, 
animations and simulations, see below), help people recognize the presence of important 
accumulations and understand how the behavior of a stock is related to its flows (Sterman 2010).  
Such tub diagrams have been used effectively with business executives and other leaders 
(Sterman 2000, ch. 2).  Simple diagrams portraying networks of stocks and the flows of material 
among them can help people expand the boundaries of their mental models by highlighting the 
stocks that constitute the sources and sinks for the flows affecting focal stocks such as the stock 
of CO2 in the atmosphere (Figures 2, 3 provide examples).  
Time delays:  Decomposition is helpful in overcoming the tendency to underestimate time 
delays.  People’s perceptions about the delays in individual steps are likely to be more salient 
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and accurate than their estimate of the overall delay (Sterman 2000, ch. 11).  Scenarios and 
simulations should include delays in the response of the social and economic system, not only in 
biogeochemical processes.  These include delays in the development and diffusion of scientific 
information, in opinion change, in the passage of legislation or negotiation of international 
agreements, in the implementation of such laws, in technological innovation and behavior 
change resulting from such laws, and in the gradual turnover of existing capital stocks.  
Feedback:  Feedback processes can be represented effectively in the form of causal loop 
diagrams.  Causal diagrams have a precise syntax (Sterman 2000, ch. 5) designed to enhance the 
ability of nonscientists to understand the feedback structure of complex systems and relate that 
structure to the likely behavior of the system (Figure 4 shows some climate-economy examples). 
The terms “positive” and “negative” feedback should be avoided in communications aimed at 
policymakers and the public because these terms are conflated with “good” and “bad”; instead 
use the terms “reinforcing” and “balancing” feedback, respectively.  Analogies with familiar 
systems such as thermostats and compound interest help explain unfamiliar processes such as the 
balancing CO2 fertilization and reinforcing ice-albedo feedback.  Simple diagrams showing a few 
feedbacks are better than comprehensive “spaghetti” diagrams.  
6.4 Interactive Learning through Simulation 
To fulfill its mission, the IPCC should develop a suite of interactive simulations and learning 
environments for policymakers and the public as an integral component of the next assessment 
report.  Why?  Effective risk communication must catalyze learning at a level deep enough to 
change entrenched mental models, attitudes and behaviors.  Mere transmission of information in 
reports and presentations is not sufficient (Weber and Stern 2011). 
   There is no learning without feedback, without knowledge of the results of our actions.  
Scientists usually generate that feedback through controlled experimentation, an iterative process 
through which intuitions are challenged, hypotheses tested, insights generated, new experiments 
run.  When experiments are impossible, as in the climate-economy system, scientists rely on 
models and simulations, which enable controlled experimentation in virtual worlds (Sterman 
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1994).  Learning arises in the process of interacting with the models, hypothesizing how the 
system might respond to policies, being surprised, forming new hypotheses, testing these with 
new simulations and data from the real world.  Paradoxically, however, scientists, having 
deepened their understanding through an iterative, interactive learning process, often turn around 
and tell the results to policymakers and the public through reports and presentations, expecting 
them to change their beliefs and behavior, then express surprise when these groups—excluded 
from the process, unable to assess the evidence on their own and presented with claims that 
conflict with deeply held beliefs—resist the message and challenge the authority of the experts.   
Interactive, transparent simulations of the climate, rigorously grounded in and consistent with 
the best available science, are now available.  To enable learning, the models must give people 
control over assumptions and scenarios, encourage wide-ranging sensitivity analysis, and run 
nearly instantly.  Examples range from simple models to help people develop their understanding 
of stocks and flows (e.g., http://bit.ly/atmco2, http://bit.ly/stockflow, Moxnes and Saysel 2009) 
to more comprehensive models such as the C-LEARN and C-ROADS climate policy simulators 
(http://climateinteractive.org).  These simulations are being used by a variety of policymakers 
and in interactive workshops for business leaders, educators and the public at large.   
When experimentation is impossible, when the consequences of our decisions unfold over 
decades and centuries, that is, for climate change and many of the important issues we face, 
simulation becomes the main—perhaps the only—way we can discover for ourselves how 
complex systems work, what the impact of different policies might be, and thus integrate science 
into decision making. 
17 
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Figure 1.  US public opinion on climate change, as reported by Gallup, with IPCC assessment report 
publication years.  The stolen so-called “Climategate” emails were made public in November 2009, just prior to 
the Copenhagen climate conference (December 2009).  Presentation order for choices in the Gallup questions 
are rotated.  See www.gallup.com/poll/126560/americans-global-warming-concerns-continue-drop.aspx. 
 
 
 
“Thinking about what is said in the 
news, in your view is the seriousness 
of global warming generally 
exaggerated, generally correct, or is 
it generally underestimated? 
 
 
Do you think that global warming 
will pose a serious threat to you or 
your way of life in your lifetime? 
 
 
 
…which one of the following 
statements do you think is most 
accurate—most scientists believe 
that global warming is occurring, 
most scientists believe that global 
warming is NOT occurring, or most 
scientists are unsure about whether 
global warming is occurring or not? 
Which of the following statements 
reflects your view of when the 
effects of global warming will begin 
to happen? They have already begun 
to happen, they will start happening 
with a few years, they will start 
happening within your lifetime, but 
they will affect future generations, 
(or) they will never happen. 
…do you believe increases in the 
Earth’s temperature over the last 
century are due more to the effects 
of pollution from human activities 
(or) natural changes in the 
environment that are not due to 
human activities?” 
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Figure 2.  Portraying stocks and flows:  The “Carbon Bathtub” (Source:  National Geographic, 2009; available at 
ngm.nationalgeographic.com/big-idea/05/carbon-bath).    
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Figure 3.  Stock-flow diagram of the carbon cycle, useful after people understand the bathtub concept, to help them 
expand the boundaries of their mental models to include the sources and sinks for the flows of carbon into and out of 
the atmosphere. Boxes denote stocks, pipes and valves denote flows. Fossil fuel use injects carbon that has been 
sequestered for millions of years into the atmosphere, where it is taken up by biomass or dissolves in the ocean, but 
eventually cycles from these stocks back into the atmosphere.  Flows showing the formation of fossil fuels from 
carbon in terrestrial soils and ocean sediments are shown in gray because these flows are, relative to human time 
scales, essentially zero.  The diagram does not show flows of C associated with the formation and weathering of 
limestone and other rocks as these flows are, on human time scales, unchanging.   
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Figure 4.  Causal diagrams illustrating feedback processes.  Arrows indicate causal influence; arrow polarity, e.g., 
€ 
x +⎯ → ⎯ y , indicates an increase in x raises y above what it would have been otherwise; 
€ 
x –⎯ → ⎯ y  indicates an 
increase in x lowers y below what it would have been otherwise (Sterman 2000, ch. 5 provides formal definitions 
and examples).  (A) Reinforcing (positive) ice-albedo feedback.  For clarity, the diagram shows a single loop.  (B) 
Balancing (negative) feedbacks around CO2 fertilization.  Diagram shows two loops to illustrate constraints on net 
CO2 uptake by biomass.  (C) Reinforcing feedback arising from learning curves and scale economies that lowers the 
price of low-carbon, renewable energy as the industry develops. 
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